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COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
subsequent events rectified the error. The defendant did change his plea to
guilty after conferring with counsel, and no steps were taken to move against
the indictment because he was deprived of counsel. The dissent, however,
pointed out that had the defendant pleaded guilty, the case would have been
identical to the Marincic case. For it is no answer, continued the dissent,
simply to say that because the defendant was not prejudiced by this error the
judgment must be affirmed. The dissent further argued, that the right to
counsel being fundamental, the denial of such right is enough to set a conviction aside.
People v. Spano,22 is the second case to point in this direction. The
defendant had retained counsel prior to being taken into custody. Once in
custody, however, he was questioned at three A.M. in the absence of counsel,
and a full confession was obtained. The majority held (4-3), that since the
defendant was provided with counsel before being taken into custody, he
thereby obtained counsel's advice as to future conduct, and this was sufficient
to show compliance with his right to aid of counsel.
While this holding supported a less rigid interpretation of the right to
the aid of counsel, it also strongly implied a less stringent interpretation of
the requirement of a delay in the proceedings. For as the dissent in the Spano
case pointed out, a defendant's right to the aid of counsel is not confined to
immediately before being taken into custody, or to any other single time,
but extends to every stage of the proceedings. Yet, the defendant in this
case, while being held no longer as a suspect, but as a defendant awaiting trial,
was questioned, and a full confession obtained in the absence of counsel. To
this practice the majority subscribes. Such a holding, contends the dissent,
makes the right of a defendant to the aid of counsel useless. The rationale of
the dissent in the Spano case was specifically upheld by the United States
Supreme Court, in overruling the decision of the New York Court of Appeals,
at every stage of the proceedings
holding that the denial of the right to counsel
2 3
is violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The logical relationship between a defendant's right to the aid of counsel
on the one hand, and a right to a delay in the proceedings to obtain counsel
on the other, is inescapable. In many cases, of which the Dolac and Spano
cases are examples, it is in fact quite difficult to make any distinction at all
between these two rights. A court cannot infringe upon one, or foster the
free operation of one, without, ipso facto, influencing the other. The better
reasoned cases, to which the instant case adheres recognizes this relationship
and thereby allows Section 699 of the Criminal Code to achieve its full
purpose.
COERCED CONFESSIONS: DUE PROCESS CHALLENGE

Under Section 395, New York Code of Criminal Procedure, the confession
22.
23.

4 N.Y.2d 256, 173 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1957).
People v. Spano, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
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of a defendant, whether in the course of judicial proceedings or to a private
person, can be given against him in evidence unless made under the influence
of fear produced by threats, or upon the stipulation of the district attorney
that he shall not be prosecuted therefor. In asserting the right to have the
voluntary nature of his confession determined, the defendant must object to
24
the confession's admission, at which time evidence is taken on that issue
If there is no conflict on the facts surrounding the confession, the question of
admissibility is for the court; existence of an issue, however, makes the question
one for the jury. 5 The United States Supreme Court will not interfere with
so long as a "fair
the right of states to regulate their own criminal procedure
20
trial," under Fourteenth Amendment due process, is had.
Defendant Kiernan,2 7 imprisoned for life on conviction as an aider and
abettor in a felony murder prosecution, processed his appeal, asserting denial
of due process, on the ground his confession was improperly submitted to the
jury. The Court of Appeals unanimously held that the evidence surrounding
Kiernan's confession was not sufficient to hold it involuntary as a matter of
law, hence its submission to the jury was proper and did not result in denial
of due process of law.
While it appears that the Court's statement of the legal principle involved
is unassailable,2 8 its decision in the instant case seems less firm. Kiernan
processed his appeal after the United States Circuit Court (Second Circuit)
& 2
In
had granted a writ of habeas corpus to Kiernan's co-defendant, Wade.
Wade's
why
reasons
factual
fourteen
listed
court
the
writ,
granting that
confession was involuntary as a matter of law. For the most part, these facts
were equally applicable to defendants Kiernan and Wade, and involved physical
80
beating, continuous questioning over a 23Y2 hour period without arraignment,
and failure to inform on the right to counsel. "This kind of treatment," said
the court, "without convincing explanation of its reasonableness, is sufficient
to indicate that the resulting statement was involuntary and that it was given
31
Kiernan may
to put an end to what most of us would consider torture."
the United
to
plea
his
with
system
court
federal
the
now attempt to get into
32
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pendent examination of the
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People v. Fox, 121 N.Y. 449, 24 N.E. 923 (1890).
See People v. Brasch, 193 N.Y. 46, 85 N.E. 809 (1908); People v. Randazzio,

194 N.Y. 147, 87 N.E. 112 (1909).

26. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); see also: Malinski v. New York,
324 U.S. 401, and Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
27. People v. Kiernan, 6 N.Y.2d 274, 189 N.Y.S.2d 215 (1959).
28. Supra note 25.
29. Wade v. Jackson, 256 F.2d 7, cert. denied 357 U.S. 908 (1958).
30. Wade and Kiernan, convicted in the State courts as aiding and abetting the
escape of two Sing Sing prisoners during which a guard was killed, were held for 231/
hours before arraignment, while the two escapees were arraigned about 6-8 hours earlier.
31. Wade v. Jackson, supra at 14.
32. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
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33
Kiernan's
without changing the New York rule of evidence in any manner,
34
law
of
matter
a
confession may be determined involuntary, as
It is true, as the New York Court of Appeals notes, 35 that Wade testified
at the trial while Kiernan did not. Kiernan, having a criminal record, obviously
chose to rely upon the evidence of involuntariness illicited from other witnesses
rather than place himself in the worst possible light before the jury by having
this record revealed through the certain attempt of the district attorney to
impeach him. The decision of the federal courts will not rest upon Kiernan's
failure to testify, but upon his rebutting the State's evidence of voluntariness,
with evidence however adduced.

ACTS: "LOITERING"; "BARBITuATE
PRESCRIPTIONS"
In order to validly impose criminal liability, a statute must, on its face,
inform the public of the acts to be avoided. 36 This general standard, laid down
37
in United States v. Brewer, has consistently been followed in New York.
Twice during the 1958 term, the New York Court of Appeals was called
upon to determine the validity of statutes challenged on the ground they were
not sufficiently informative as required; one concerned with barbituate prescrip39
tions,88 the other with loitering.
A provision of the Sanitary Code of the City of New York was attacked in
People v. Caswell-Massey Co.40 The challenged section provided in its first
subdivision that telephonic barbituate prescriptions could be filled without ever
being reduced to writing; in its third subdivision, that prescriptions for barbituates may not be refilled unless the original contains authorization in writing
to do so. Reasoning from the impossibility of there being written authorization
in an oral prescription, while refill of barbituate prescriptions is allowed under
subdivision three generally, the majority (4-3) struck the provision as confusing to the ordinarily intelligent person.
The dissent insists there is no confusion about what is prohibited by
the statute. Notwithstanding that a telephonic prescription, never reduced
to writing, is valid and lawful, no original prescription not containing express
written authorization for refilling, may be refilled.
Conceding the validity of the dissent's argument, there remains the
instance of an original prescription, in whatever form, reordered orally by
the same physician for the same patient, the instance, in fact, upon which the
Caswell-Massey case arises. Recognizing that the court is striking this statute
SUFFICIENT SPECIFICATION OF CR.mINAL

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
472, 168
38.
39.
40.

That embodied in Section 395, N.Y. CoDE Csm. PROC.
Malinski v. New York, supra.
People v. Kiernan, supra at 276, 189 N.Y.S.2d 215, 217.
United States v. Brewer, 139 U.S. 278 (1891).
People v. Vetri, 309 N.Y. 401, 131 N.E.2d 568 (1955); People v. Firth, 3 N.Y.2d
N.Y.S.2d 949 (1957).
People v. Caswell-Massey Co., 6 N.Y.2d 497, 190 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1959).
People v. Johnson, 6 N.Y.2d 549, 190 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1959).
Supra note 38.
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because of uncertainty upon its face, and not because it was invalidly applied,
the majority decision seems to rest, though it is not clearly articulated, upon
the fact that the section in question does not proscribe the "refilling" in such
circumstances with the sufficiency required by the Brewer case.41
On the same day it decided the Caswell-Massey case, the Court in People
v. Johnson,42 upheld Section 722-b, 4 3 of the New York Penal Law. Defendant
argued that the use of the words "loiter," or "loitering," alone, were insufficient to describe the acts made criminal by the statute.
In 1953, the Court, in People v. Bell,44 upheld a provision of the New
York Penal Law which provided:
Any person who loiters about any toilet, station or station platform
of a subway or elevated railway or of a railroad, or who is found
sleeping therein or thereon and who is unable to give satisfactory
explanation of his presence is guilty of an offense."
Both the majority and the dissent in the Bell case, agreed that if the section
had ended without the proviso, ". . . and who is unable to give satisfactory
explanation of his presence... ," its validity would be unquestionable for the
word "loiter" had taken on a definite meaning by long statutory usage. 40
In 1958, however, the Court struck the "loitering" ordinance of the City
of Dunkirk in the case of People v. Diaz,47 the statute providing simply,
"No person shall lounge or loiter about any street or street comer in the City
of Dinkirk." In declaring the ordinance void, the Court said, "while the
term loiter . . . has by long usage acquired a common and accepted meaning,
it does not follow that by itself, and without more, such term is enough to
inform a citizen of its criminal implications... ." The Court further explained
its position by reference to the New York Penal Law, wherein "loiter" was
used to "point up" the prohibited act, viz: with the intent to commit a breach
of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace is committed. 48 Used in this
manner, the term becomes significant and convictions will not be reversed for
lack of clarity as to the act proscribed. 49 Since "loitering," by definition, may
include innocent conduct, the Court concluded that the Dunkirk ordinance,
41.

Supra note 36.

42. Supra note 39.

N.Y. PEN. LAW § 722-b:
Any person not the parent or legal guardian of a pupil in regular attendance at said school who loiters in or about any school building or
grounds without written permission from the principal, custodian or
other person in charge thereof, or in violation of posted rules or regulations governing the use thereof, shall be guilty of disorderly conduct.
44. People v. Bell, 306 N.Y. 110, 115 N.E.2d 821 (1953).
43.

45.

N.Y. PEx.

LAW § 1990-a(2).

46. The majority holds the clause beginning ". . . and who is unable . . . ,"is
merely a procedure for determining whether the suspect is legitimately present, and
does not affect the substance of the provision.
47. People v. Diaz, 4 N.Y.2d 469, 176 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1958).
48. N.Y. PEN. LAw § 722.
49. People v. Galpern, 259 N.Y. 279, 181 N.E. 572, 83 A.L.R. 785 (1932); People
v. Gaskin, 306 N.Y. 837, 118 N.E.2d 903 (1954).

